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As a rising state, China has embraced, adapted, and increased the use of public 
diplomacy to influence foreign audiences in support of its strategic objectives. China’s 
public diplomacy program is the cornerstone of its effort to re-brand the country’s image 
as a responsible international power and as an attractive economic partner. The 
quantitative analysis of this thesis explores which types of events tend to drive China’s 
public diplomacy volume and whether China uses public diplomacy to shape the online 
global discussion prior to or after domestic and foreign events. Using data derived from 
website monitoring tools, combined with machine-generated international events data, 
this analysis demonstrates that it is possible to analyze the relationship between China’s 
public diplomacy volume and event data to enable assessment of the drivers of China’s 
public diplomacy. In addition to the statistical results, this project also seeks to provide 
useful lessons for how the U.S. Department of Defense can take advantage of Internet 
monitoring tools to better understand the information environment.  
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Globalization and the information revolution have connected the world, making it 
easier for governments to communicate and influence foreign audiences. As a rising state, 
China has embraced, adapted, and increased its use of public diplomacy to influence 
foreign audiences in support of its objectives. At the same time, the relative power of 
Western countries has stagnated for the first time since the end of the Cold War, as 
Christopher Layne argues in his 2012 article “The End of Pax Americana: How Western 
Decline Became Inevitable.”1 China’s “peaceful rise” has so far been like no other 
country in history, as China has established government, economic, and influence 
operations on every continent with little to no opposition. This suggests that China has 
implemented a strategy that is mutually beneficial to foreign governments, their 
populations, and China itself. How is China able to make beneficial deals with foreign 
governments and remain in good standing with the host nation populations? One 
argument is that it is all about the appeal of China’s economy, driven by global market 
incentives. However, another compelling argument is that the growing attraction of China 
is a result of its use of public diplomacy. China’s public diplomacy program is the 
cornerstone of its effort to re-brand the country’s image as a responsible international 
power and an attractive economic partner.  
A. PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to analyze what drives Chinese public 
diplomacy. The quantitative analysis of this research explores whether China uses public 
diplomacy to shape global discussion in advance of domestic and foreign events, or if 
public diplomacy is instead a reactionary tool used to influence global perceptions post 
hoc. The work also examines the relationship between domestic protest, force posture 
changes, and diplomatic- and foreign aid-related events as potential drivers of public 
diplomacy messaging. The secondary purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the 
                                                 
1 Christopher Layne, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable,” 
Atlantic, April 26, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-
americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/.  
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Department of Defense (DOD) can take advantage of Internet monitoring tools, such as 
the Crimson Hexagon programs and the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone 
Project (GDELT Project), to understand the information environment, using the analysis 
of Chinese public diplomacy as a case study to do so.  
B. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The following chapters progress through the topic of China’s public diplomacy 
program and then proceed to recommendations about how to use the knowledge gained 
from this project. The first three chapters examine background information about public 
diplomacy, China’s strategic objectives, public diplomacy efforts, and the challenges of 
China’s public diplomacy program. The fourth chapter explores the results of the 
quantitative analysis, examining how China uses public diplomacy in relation to 
particular events over time. The final chapter addresses the implications of this research 
for DOD planners and provides recommendations for the future use of Internet-
monitoring tools to help the U.S. military gain a position of advantage within the 
information environment. 
C. DEFINING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
Most scholars agree on a common definition of public diplomacy, but opinions 
differ when it comes to how to measure public diplomacy programs. The remainder of 
this section focuses on literature about public diplomacy theory, active measurement 
methods, and passive listening methods of assessment of public diplomacy programs. 
Almost every piece of literature reviewed for this topic offers its own definition of 
public diplomacy. Nonetheless, most scholars agree that public diplomacy is when a 
government deliberately communicates with foreign mass public audiences to influence 
their “attitudes or opinions” in a manner that is favorable to that government.2 However, 
                                                 
2 Gifford Malone, “Managing Public Diplomacy,” Washington Quarterly 8(1985): 199–213; Benno 
Signitzer and Timothy Coombs, “Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Divergence,” Public 
Relations Review 18, no. 2 (1992): 137–147; Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission hearing: China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations, its Intelligence Activities that 
Target the United States and its Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, 111th Cong., 1 (2009) 
(statement of Nicholas J. Cull), http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.30.09Cull.pdf.  
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there are some minor differences in the definitions. For example, Joseph Nye states that 
public diplomacy is a communication instrument used to “mobilize resources to attract 
foreign audiences.”3 Additionally, Hans Tuch differentiates his definition of public 
diplomacy “as a process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring 
about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well 
as its national goals and current policies.”4 Finally, Nicholas J. Cull defines public 
diplomacy as “the process by which an international actor conducts foreign policy by 
engaging a foreign public.”5 A foreign government engaging with foreign audiences is a 
more accurate depiction of public diplomacy because governments use different forms of 
influence or diplomacy, not just communication.  
As the definition of public diplomacy states, the main objective is to influence 
foreign mass audiences, but the reasons why governments use public diplomacy are more 
complex. The so-called ‘Information Age’ has expanded the reach of public diplomacy 
into areas that were once inaccessible to shape public opinion and help governments 
manage foreign perceptions.6 Governments understand that perception is reality, and 
public diplomacy allows a state to compete in the war of ideas, where winning is 
dependent on whose message is the most influential.7 Finally, if governments are trying 
to influence foreign public opinion about their country, states can use public diplomacy 
assessments as a feedback mechanism to policy makers, who can adjust their 
governments’ domestic and foreign policies to be more appealing to foreign audiences.8  
The means of public diplomacy are dependent on the state’s goals and the target 
audience. Published government texts (speeches, press releases, and congressional 
                                                 
3 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 95. Nye is alluding to a similar concept as the earlier stated definition 
but his focus on attraction power is an important distinction. 
4 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1990), 3.  
5 Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic.   
6 Tuch, Communicating with the World, 5.  
7 Tuch, Communicating with the World, 5; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Emergence of 
Neopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).  
8 Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic, 1.  
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transcripts), magazines, websites, cultural/art exhibits, cultural and information centers 
throughout the world, and exchanges, such as the Fulbright Academic Exchange 
Program, are just some of the means of public diplomacy.9 There are three major Western 
models of public diplomacy. The basic Cold War model is driven by an “antagonistic” 
relationship between countries, the non-state transnational model uses the activities of 
groups like nongovernmental organizations or businesses, and the domestic public 
relations model focuses on efforts by governments to hire outside public relations firms 
or lobbyists to support foreign policy objectives.10 Based on its goals, a state can also use 
a combination of these models as well as a variety of public diplomacy means to 
influence its target audiences. 
D. ACTIVE ASSESSMENT METHOD 
The first major category for measuring public diplomacy is through active 
methods of assessment or public opinion surveys. Polling sample populations has become 
the preferred method of measuring the success of public diplomacy; however, while 
public diplomacy goals have short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, polling results 
only represent opinions at that given time.11 Nye states that people’s opinions change and 
that the only way to show trends in public opinion is to conduct polls consistently over 
time.12 Worldwide index surveys and polling individual members of a population provide 
insight into the perceptions of a country; however, there has been no research done to test 
the relationship between worldwide index survey results and public diplomacy.13  
                                                 
9 Tuch, Communicating with the World, 58–85. This is a list of the mediums of public diplomacy 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
10 Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 59.    
11 Ian Hall and Frank Smith, “The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional 
Competition,” Asian Security 9, no.1 (2013): 6. Hall and Smith raise a valid point that there is little 
correlation between public diplomacy and changes in public opinion. They admit that polling data cannot 
be ignored, but offer that there is little evidence to infer that public diplomacy is a driver of public opinion. 
12 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 
18.  
13 Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” 64.  
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There are numerous critiques of the use of polling as a measure of public 
diplomacy. Nye proclaimed that there is nothing concrete about public diplomacy 
effectiveness—it is hard to measure, and is often dependent on whether or not people 
change their mind.14 Polling data and statistics alone do not prove whether a public 
diplomacy program is effective, but rather provide background information and a 
baseline of public opinion.15 Additionally, polling data generally reflects how a sample 
population views a certain country’s image or reputation, but this provides little insight 
into what specifically influences perceptions.16 Another weakness of polls is that the 
sample size of surveys is usually small and that the questions are closed-ended, broad, 
and do not allow for in-depth understanding of what drives public opinion.17  
Another active measure of public diplomacy is what Ali Fisher refers to as the 
network effect (TNE).18 The TNE was a British Council (a UK government public 
diplomacy organization) approach designed to “nurture networks between generations of 
leaders” during conferences and international exchanges to measure relationships that 
grew and expanded because of the exchanges.19 This form of network effort is best suited 
for educational and professional exchanges, as it can analyze how the network and 
relationships of influential people can grow from before, during, and after the exchange 
has taken place.20 This form of active networking allows an organization to pinpoint 
                                                 
14 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 101.  
15 Ingrid d’Hooghe, The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations Clingendael, 2007), http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Hoogue_the-rise-of-china-public-diplomacy.pdf, 36; Pierre C. Pahlavi, 
“Evaluating Public Diplomacy Programmes,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2, no. 3 (2007): 265; David 
Steven, “Evaluation and the New Public Diplomacy” (presented at 842nd Wilton Park Conference: The 
Future of Public Diplomacy, Dorset, UK, 2007), http://www.riverpath.com/wp-
content/uploads/Public_Diplomacy_and_Evaluation_Wilton_Park_030707.pdf, 12.  
16 Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,”63; Gregory G. Holyk, “Paper Tiger? 
Chinese Soft Power in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 2 (2011): 227.   
17 d’Hooghe, The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy, 36.  
18 Ali Fisher, Mapping the Great Beyond: Identifying Meaningful Networks in Public Diplomacy, CPD 
Perspectives on Public Diplomacy Paper No. 2 (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2010), 
http://stage.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/publications/perspectives/CP
DPerspectivesMappingNetworks.pdf, 53. 
19 Ibid., 53–57. 
20 Pahlavi, “Evaluating Public Diplomacy Programmes;” Fisher, Mapping the Great Beyond, 53–57. 
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known persons of influence in other organizations to increase the effectiveness of people-
to-people diplomacy, and to assess its outcomes. 
E. PASSIVE LISTENING  
The second major category for measuring public diplomacy is passive listening. 
Passive listening uses technical methods of analysis to “listen” or gather data about a 
given topic using network analysis, social media, event, and news media monitoring. The 
network measurement approach uses social media technology to convert the public 
diplomacy process into an interactive process in which states can rely on the audience to 
send and receive public diplomacy information within their own influence networks.21 
This allows the sending organization to map and analyze the interactions, relationships, 
opinions, and feedback of the network to allow the message senders to adjust their 
strategy as needed to be more effective.22 
The use of technical tools to monitor social media and online news media to 
conduct network analysis is an important tool in public diplomacy assessment. One 
example is the use of networks to map Twitter hashtags to determine what topics are 
trending on Twitter, or building a network to show relationships of users and locations of 
the discussions.23 Organizations can also build network illustrations to show who is 
following their organization, track their interactions with other users, and then analyze 
the data to understand how influential their public diplomacy campaign may or may not 
be in social media conversations.24 Influence tracking is another passive method that 
attempts to pinpoint influential people in a population, discern and track their opinions, 
and analyze the influencers’ relationships through network analysis.25 
The second passive listening approach is through Internet-based news media 
monitoring. News media analysis consists of content analysis, which tracks the coverage 
                                                 
21 Rhonda S. Zaharna, Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 
9/11 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  
22 Ibid., 4.   
23 Fisher, Mapping the Great Beyond, 63.  
24 Ibid., 64–68.  
25 Steven, “Evaluation and the New Public Diplomacy,” 15.  
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and portrayal of a story or issue in the media over time.26 Additionally, news media 
monitoring tracks whether a topic trends positively or negatively in the media and can 
help determine how influential media sources are in a given area.27 For this thesis, 
Chinese public diplomacy is analyzed using data derived from the passive listening 
monitoring tool provided by Crimson Hexagon.  
An important concept in both the active and passive approaches is the outcome 
dependent approach, which is that the desired outcome of the public diplomacy program 
determines the tools of evaluation.28 According to David Steven, there are five 
intermediate outcomes of public diplomacy: “changing perceptions, setting an agenda, 
building networks, developing capacity, and changing institutions.”29 The logic is that 
each outcome drives the process and the type of evaluation, as well as the tools used to 
gather the data for analysis. For example, if an organization needs to assess changing 
perceptions, then it should use case studies, survey data, and third-party research.30 
Additionally, if an organization wants to assess international partnerships, it should 
analyze established networks, reports from those whom it has an established relationship, 
and analyze the activity of the network through media analysis, and through the tracking 
of influencers and topics.31  
Public opinion data and network-based approaches to understanding public 
diplomacy are valuable. This thesis analyzes the use of public diplomacy in relation to 
event data over time, in the hopes that this process could provide analysts with another 
mechanism to understand what drives a government’s public diplomacy efforts. This 
insight can help a government counter or preempt another state’s public diplomacy to 
compete more effectively for influence in the information environment. Before exploring 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 Ibid., 15.  
28 Ibid., 12. Steven does not have a title for this framework except a description of Figure 6 on page 13 
stating, “Collecting evidence to show progress against intermediate outcomes.”  
29 Ibid., 12.   
30 Ibid., 13.  
31 Steven, “Evaluation and the New Public Diplomacy,” 13. 
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what drives China’s use of public diplomacy, it is critical to understand the PRC’s 
strategic objectives and how those objectives are related to China’s use of public 
diplomacy. 
 9
II. CHINA’S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
Political scientist Joseph Nye wrote, “A communications strategy cannot work if 
it cuts against the grain of policy. Actions speak louder than words, and public diplomacy 
that appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection is unlikely to 
succeed.”32 Nye’s comment highlights the importance of nesting public diplomacy within 
a strategy that effectively uses words and deeds in concert to achieve strategic objectives. 
To analyze the effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy programs, it is important to 
have a basic understanding of China’s foreign policy strategy. Through this 
understanding of strategy, it is then possible to understand how and why China influences 
foreign audiences through public diplomacy. The following section highlights China’s 
strategic objectives through the lenses of economics, political influence, and military 
goals, based upon the analysis of a combination of Western and Chinese government 
documents and scholarly works.  
Prior to any deeper discussion about China’s strategy, it is important to 
communicate a disclaimer about China’s national objectives or grand strategy. All of the 
information, analysis, and conclusions for this thesis are a result of open source research. 
As Aaron Friedberg discusses in Contest for Supremacy, both Western and Chinese 
scholars, diplomats, and analysts have written extensively on Chinese strategy, but any 
attempt to describe China’s grand strategy using the available open and even classified 
resources will “contain gaps and inferential leaps.”33 As with most states, the full details 
of strategic decisions are not available to the public, especially in the case of an 
authoritarian state like China. Therefore, inferences must be made using the information 
available, which here means that the assessment of China’s strategy will be developed 
through an analysis of multiple open source documents from both Western and Chinese 
sources. 
                                                 
32 Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 101. 
33 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia 
(New York: WW Norton & Company, 2011), 122.   
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Most, if not all, nations have some type of strategy, set of goals, or ideals that 
guide their foreign policy decisions and actions. China is no exception; however, like 
most countries, China’s grand strategy is not a detailed formal document but rather a 
“consensus of People’s Republic of China (PRC) foreign policy goals,” which guides 
international action.34 Another way to think of grand strategy is that it is a government’s 
strategic vision for the future, which links strategy to policy, policy to resources, and 
resources to action.35 The definition of grand strategy utilized here is  
the art of integrated use of national strategic resources to fulfill national 
security and international objectives, whereby a state uses it strategic 
resources and strategic means, at the political, economic, military, cultural, 
and ideological levels, to protect and further the country’s overall security, 
values, national interests, and so on.36 
Based on this definition, the three supporting focus areas of China’s grand 
strategy are economics, global political influence, and military goals. These three focus 
areas align with China’s motivation to achieve its overarching goal of “rejuvenating and 
building a strong, prosperous, modern socialist society rooted in a harmonious culture by 
2049.”37 Understanding China’s grand strategy is important to public diplomacy because 
the actions taken to achieve strategic objectives not only drive public diplomacy efforts, 
but are also actions that China can use to illustrate to global audiences that it is a 
responsible and valuable global partner.  
A. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
The economic goals that underlie China’s grand strategy are to increase global 
economic ties, develop efficiency-focused industrialization, and sustain domestic 
                                                 
34 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 17. 
35 Ibid., 19. 
36 Men Honghua, “How to Conduct Grand Strategy Studies—A Discussion of the Significance of 
China’s Grand Strategy Studies” (paper presented at Renmin University, Beijing, July 2004), cited in 
Timothy L. Thomas, Geothinking Like the Chinese: A Potential Explanation of China’s Geostrategy (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2009), 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/geothinking-like-the-chinese.pdf, 31.  
37 Information Office of the State Council of China, Chinese Military Strategy (Beijing: Information 
Office of the State Council of China, 2015), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/index.htm, 5.  
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legitimacy. According to a 2011 Chinese white paper, the economic goals aim to increase 
the Chinese people’s standard of living and quality of life as well as to improve China’s 
overall international competitiveness, which would promote stability for China, the Asian 
Pacific region, and a “harmonious world.”38 The reasoning behind its peaceful 
development policy in the economic sector is that “China’s development could not be 
achieved without the world, and the world’s development likewise could not be achieved 
without China.”39 To continue economic growth, China requires access to import and 
export markets. To ensure access to these markets, China relies on a combination of 
agreements and a diverse network of trading and investing partners.40 Additionally, this 
allows China to globally extend its economic influence and diversify its agreements 
through multiple countries, thus limiting the amount of economic leverage any one actor 
may have over it.41 In an effort to increase economic efficiency, China is determined to 
lower natural resource consumption, utilize domestic energy sources, and establish an 
optimal workforce allocation to meet growing domestic and international production 
demands necessary to maintain profits.42 Domestically, a strong economy will continue to 
maintain the Communist Party’s legitimacy, improve living standards/expectations, and 
potentially stifle inequality in China.43 
Internationally, Chinese foreign policy functions under the national strategy to 
support economic growth and modernization, to reunify China with Taiwan, and to 
increase China’s global stature. To promote economic growth, China relies on building 
                                                 
38 Information Office of the State Council of China, China’s Peaceful Development (Beijing: 
Information Office of the State Council of China, 2011), http://www.gov.cn/english/offical/20011-
09/06/content_1941354.htr.  
39 Jia Xiudong, “Win-ein Philosophy: Eliminating Zero-Sum Rules,” Renmin Ribao Online, December 
28, 2012, trans. Open Source Enterprise, https://www.opensource.gov.  
40 Avery Goldstein, “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian Turn,” in 
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 83.   
41 Ibid.  
42 Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, 84, no. 5 (2005): 
21.  
43 Congressional Research Service, China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia, 
and Africa (S. PRT 110–46) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf, 4.  
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relationships and partnerships and keeping an open dialogue with a diverse range of 
countries to promote a stable environment.44 The effects of these partnerships are 
twofold. First, the partnerships nest partner nation’s interests with China’s interests and 
second, it deters competing nations from joining against China, as it would be too 
economically costly.45 Moreover, China’s actions in Africa are a great example of the 
results of Chinese foreign policy leading to beneficial economic outcomes. China has 
gained access to the resource rich African countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and 
South Africa through diplomatic and trade agreements, which opened the door for other 
economic initiatives, such as financial loans, cultural exchanges, education projects, 
mining/oil rights agreements, and the establishment of Chinese-based media outlets.46  
B. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
China uses its foreign policy, through partnerships and outreach, to influence 
global audiences to support reunifying China with Taiwan, to counter Chinese threat 
concerns, and to promote peaceful development. By using economic and social 
integration, deterring internal Taiwanese independence movements, and by gaining 
commitment from other world powers to support the one-China policy, China has applied 
an indirect strategy to recover Taiwan.47 Additionally, China has reached out to countries 
in Latin America, Africa, and the Pacific to influence states to sever their relationships 
with Taiwan and often uses the one-China policy as a precondition for agreements, 
humanitarian assistance, or investment deals.48 
In a competitive world, powerful nations are constantly maneuvering to position 
themselves advantageously, and China is no exception. The Chinese strategic goal of 
power transition is based upon China’s standing as one of the world’s oldest civilizations 
and their belief that only China has the ability to compete with the United States and 
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change the international order to be more favorable to China.49 To accomplish this 
transition, the focus of Chinese foreign policy is to maximize China’s reach of influence 
to as many people, agencies, and governments as possible through a wide range of 
coordinated Chinese agencies, businesses, and actions.50 Additionally, China has donated 
billions for foreign infrastructure development, education programs, and government 
ministries with the goal of influencing local populations and convincing governments that 
China is a reliable global power.51 Power transition is often threatening to other nations, 
which is why China has pursued multilateral diplomatic relations in an effort to counter 
threat perceptions.52  
The international community may feel threatened by China’s economic and 
military development and modernization and by China’s push to influence the 
international environment. However, China attempts to reassure the world through the 
strategic concept of “peaceful development.” China’s reference to peaceful development 
has both domestic and international meanings. Domestically, peaceful development refers 
to the “common prosperity of the people” in building a modern, harmonious society.53 
Externally, peaceful development refers to the building of a harmonious world based 
upon “equality, mutual trust, including and learning from one another and mutually 
beneficial cooperation.”54 China’s 2011 “Peaceful Development” white paper states that 
it will “promote friendly relations with other countries based upon the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence,” which are “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, 
and peaceful coexistence.”55 The next chapter explores in more detail this ‘peaceful 
development’ theme as part of China’s overall public diplomacy strategy.  
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C. MILITARY GOALS 
China’s military supports the PRC’s grand strategy through a defensive military 
policy, and continued modernization. In May 2015, China’s State Council Information 
Office of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) released a white paper describing 
China’s military strategy, which highlighted eight strategic tasks. The strategic tasks 
include safeguarding Chinese sovereignty and interests (domestic and overseas), 
“reunification of the motherland,” as well as strategic deterrence, maintaining regional 
peace through military cooperation, counterterrorism, and humanitarian missions.56 One 
of the most prominent and controversial examples of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) safeguarding China’s interests and territory are the PLA force projections in the 
South China Sea to protect Chinese territorial claims.  
China has also deployed troops to support cooperative military missions to 
combat piracy, terrorism, and to support United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.57 
For example, over the last 15 years, China has conducted training and exercises with 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Russia, which are focused on countering 
terrorism in central Asia.58 In addition, in 2007, China sent 125 “special police” officers 
to Haiti as part of a UN peacekeeping force59 as well as additional peacekeeping forces to 
Liberia, South Sudan, Darfur, Sudan, and Democratic Republic of the Congo.60 
To accomplish strategic objectives, modernization has also been a top priority of 
the PLA. Between 1997 and 2007, China quadrupled its annual spending on military 
equipment from $3.1 to $12.3 billion, purchasing an array of surface-to-surface and 
surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and surface 
and submarine naval vessels.61 China explains that the purpose of its military 
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modernization “…is to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and 
interests of national development.”62  
Understanding China’s strategic objectives is just the first step in analyzing 
China’s public diplomacy and its effectiveness in influencing global audiences. China’s 
economic, technological, and military modernization ambitions, coupled with its desire to 
take on a stronger international leadership role, send a variety of signals to the 
international community. At face value, the aim of creating a prosperous and harmonious 
society, both domestically and internationally, seems to be a genuine and a well-
intentioned goal; however, when members of the international community interpret 
China’s actions, they are often viewed as a potential threat to the regional balance of 
power. For this reason, China has invested manpower and money to positively influence 
foreign audiences through its public diplomacy programs and campaigns. This notion is 
reflective of Nye’s argument that actions speak louder than words and that public 
diplomacy cannot be successful if it is just “window dressing for hard power.”63  
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III. CHINA’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
Implementation of strategy along economic, international, and military lines has 
implications in foreign countries, and it requires a public diplomacy program to educate 
and influence foreign populations. Journalist Joshua Cooper Ramo stated that “China’s 
greatest strategic threat today is its national image.”64 He went on to say that, if 
perception is reality, then global perception of China affects the prospects of the future 
development of China.65 Ramo’s comments illustrate the important role China’s public 
diplomacy plays in managing foreign perceptions and misinterpretations related to 
foreign policy actions. Additionally, Professor He Lan of the Communications University 
of China, wrote in 2010 that the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s goal for public diplomacy 
was to “secure the support of foreign public opinion in an effort to direct domestic public 
opinion.”66 This illustrates how important China’s national image is to the national 
interest both domestically and internationally. The following section highlights China’s 
historic use of public diplomacy, its goals, tools, and the overarching themes of its public 
diplomacy program. 
A. CHINA’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HISTORY 
As China’s government has evolved over time, so too has its public diplomacy. 
Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October of 1949 until the 
post-Mao 1970s, China’s public diplomacy was focused on the developing socialist 
nations throughout the world and contained strong communist and socialist ideological 
messages.67 After President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and under Deng Xiaoping’s 
leadership in the late 1970s, China “opened up” to the world, and its public diplomacy 
was not as assertive under Deng’s “low-profile foreign policy.”68 After the Tiananmen 
                                                 
64 Joshua Cooper Ramo, Brand China (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), 9.  
65 Ibid., 7.  
66 He Lan, “Strengthening Public Diplomacy and Reducing Public Opinion Noise,” Xiandai Guoji 
Guanxi, November 20, 2010, trans. Open Source Enterprise, https://www.opensource.gov.    
67 Zhang Xiaoling, “Chinese State Media Going Global,” East Asia Policy 2, no. 1 (2010): 43 
http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/Vol2No1_ZhangXiaoling.pdf.  
68 Ibid., 43.  
 18
Square crackdown in June of 1989, the 1990s were a decade focused on addressing the 
negative perceptions of the international community regarding human rights in China and 
improving China’s broken image.69 In the 2000s, China’s public diplomacy has been 
directed at addressing the world’s concerns over China’s rise through the concept of the 
“peaceful rise.”70 As this century progresses, China’s public diplomacy continues to 
evolve and respond to the ever changing globalized environment. 
In the era of globalization, it is clear that China sees the value of public diplomacy 
as a means to support its foreign policy objectives through the influence of foreign 
audiences. Advances in communications technology and transportation due to 
globalization have produced an interconnected international environment between 
countries, businesses, and people who are more willing and able to interact.71 This 
creates an environment in which “domestic issues will be internationalized while 
international issues nationalized,” thus making it necessary for governments to use public 
diplomacy to communicate with foreign audiences to explain domestic policies and 
promote international policy initiatives.72 The use of public diplomacy by China to 
address domestic and international issues is especially important for its approach in 
influencing the Chinese diaspora or Chinese living overseas. Chinese leaders and public 
diplomacy officials believe that China must set the tone of international communications, 
especially to the Chinese diaspora, as they represent a critical means of people-to-people 
diplomacy within the countries they live but only if they themselves are compelled or 
persuaded to support China’s goals.73  
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B. CHINA’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GOALS 
Chinese public diplomacy supports its national strategy through five overarching 
communication goals. The first goal is to inform foreign audiences that China seeks to 
peacefully become a global power through economic development and modernization 
and to gain world acceptance of Chinese power.74 The second goal is to influence foreign 
audiences to invest in China and promote trade to grow the Chinese economy.75 The third 
goal is to counter the negative global perceptions about China’s international intentions 
by disproving the “China threat” perceptions and showcase China as a trustworthy 
international actor.76 The fourth goal is to educate foreign audiences through cultural 
diplomacy that displays China’s rich, vibrant history, people, and art.77 The fifth goal is 
to influence global opinion leaders by showing the world a positive image of China’s 
domestic environment to improve the international perception and legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and by highlighting China’s harmonious society.78 
These goals also drive Chinese government officials to understand the necessity of 
developing a strong public diplomacy program that uses a variety of tools. 
C. CHINA’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOOLS 
China has a diverse range of public diplomacy tools it uses to influence foreign 
audiences, and the three greatest are the media, education institutions/exchanges, and 
China-sponsored events. China has expanded the role of domestically run media sources 
such as CCTV, Xinhua, and Chinese Radio International broadcasts to target international 
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audiences in almost every major language, and it has hired a number of foreign anchors.79 
With the advent of satellite TV in the early 1990s, China took advantage of the 
international broadcasting opportunity provided by household satellite receivers.80 Since 
the early 1990s, China Central Television (CCTV) has steadily increased its international 
broadcasts, beginning in 1992 with CCTV-4 (Mandarin), CCTV-9 (English) in 2000, 
CCTV-Spain/France in 2004, CCTV-Arabic, and CCTV-Russian in 2009.81 Currently, 
CCTV International reaches over 83.8 million subscribers in 137 countries with target 
audiences ranging from Chinese living abroad to mainstream Western audiences.82 
Additionally, China has expanded its public diplomacy efforts via the Internet by 
redesigning web pages and social media sites. In 1997, the China National Network 
(www.china.com.cn) was created as a medium to promote China overseas.83 The PRC 
State Council Information Office (SCIO) designs many of its websites for the purpose of 
public diplomacy promoting official government information, Chinese culture, and to 
provide news in multiple languages.84 On social media, China’s media outlets and public 
diplomacy messages are easy to find on Twitter, Facebook, and through the China 
National Network. Even though Twitter is banned in China, all the major Chinese media 
outlets have Twitter accounts in multiple languages as do Chinese government 
organizations like the State Council Information Office, China’s mission to the United 
Nations and European Union, the Chinese Communist Party, and even China’s President 
Xi Jinping.85 Most of the messages on social media and within the Chinese international 
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media broadcasts revolve around current news events, sports, economics, cultural events, 
and promote “an image of prosperity and societal success.”86 
Even though China has modified and expanded its use and global reach of the 
media, Western audiences are still skeptical about Chinese media and messages. 
Understanding that the international community may view Chinese media as propaganda, 
CCTV and other CCP controlled media outlets have taken more of a Western journalistic 
approach to telling China’s story to foreign audiences by covering topics like China’s 
energy and pollution crisis.87 However, the Chinese media have applied an “active 
defense” involving controversial topics for China; issues like Taiwan, Tibet, corruption, 
human rights, and political stability either are avoided or are covered from a more 
positive perspective.88 Instead, the media focuses its international messages about China 
on the topics of peaceful development and the win-win benefits of China’s rise.89 
China also uses Confucius Institutes throughout the world and other educational 
exchanges as a primary means of influencing foreign audiences for long-term benefits. In 
2002, China announced its plan to establish worldwide Confucius Institutes as a means of 
promoting the Chinese language and culture to the world.90 Established in 2004, the first 
Confucius Institute opened to “develop and facilitate the teaching of the Chinese 
language overseas and promote educational and cultural exchange and cooperation 
between China and other international community’s [sic].”91 As of April 2016, there were 
500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius Classrooms in over 135 countries.92  
Additionally, China uses student exchanges to promote Chinese language and 
culture to foreign students. Foreign student exchanges in China utilize a home field 
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advantage, allowing China to display a positive image and culture directly to foreign 
audiences. According to Wen Jiabao, the former premier of the State Council for the 
PRC, student exchanges are valuable because they “fostered an image of China as a 
country that is committed to reform and opening, a country of unity and dynamism, a 
country that upholds equality and values friendship, and a country that is sincere and 
responsible.”93 Furthermore, the economic appeal of the Chinese markets and economy 
has created a large demand from foreign students to learn Mandarin and about Chinese 
culture and business customs with a future goal of “doing business with China.”94 The 
Institute of International Education’s Project Atlas estimated that in 2014, about 377,054 
international students were attending institutions of higher learning in China.95  
Furthermore, China uses cultural, sport, and business-related events both 
domestically and overseas as a tool of public diplomacy to promote China’s brand to 
foreign audiences. Examples of events hosted in China are the 2001 Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, the World Exhibition in 2012 in Shanghai, the 
Asian games, the 2008 Olympic Games, and the annual Boao Forum for Asia, which is 
an economic forum held in Boao, China.96 Additional events take place in the target 
audience nations to promote China and increase Chinese influence. “Chinese Culture 
Weeks” and “China Year” are a series of organized cultural and art exhibits, sporting 
events, dance/music performances, and other cultural events designed to highlight the 
rich culture of China as well as build relationships between China and the different 
cultures around the world.97 Finally, China has begun to use businesses and companies as 
a means of outreach to global audiences. Coupled with China’s foreign business strategy 
of companies “going out,” China views business interactions overseas as a public 
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diplomacy opportunity to promote cross-cultural exchange and present the Chinese 
political and economic models.98 Chinese Institute of International Studies researcher 
Zhang Weiwei argues that using businesses for public diplomacy will help make China 
more approachable and dispel doubts about China by the West and aid its greater 
economic modernization objectives.99 
From this review, it is clear that China’s public diplomacy programs and efforts 
consist of diverse means that support its strategic ends. Additionally, China has expanded 
its use of public diplomacy over the last 20 years by expanding its global media reach, 
education and businesses exchanges, Confucius Institutes, and public diplomacy events to 





                                                 
98 Zhang Weiwei, “Public Diplomacy: Establishing a National Image,” Authority Forum: Renmin 
Ribao Online, December 28, 2012, trans. Open Source Enterprise, https://www.opensource.gov.    
99 Ibid.  
 24
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 25
IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
The advent of Internet monitoring tools combined with China’s increased desire 
to improve its global image using online social and news media sources, makes China an 
excellent case study concerning the use and assessment of public diplomacy. This study 
expands on previous research cited above, which utilized passive listening tools to 
measure the effects of public diplomacy. However, instead of measuring how public 
diplomacy is impacting public opinion, this study focuses on what drives China’s public 
diplomacy in the first place, and whether its use is to preempt or react to major events. 
This chapter analyzes China’s online public diplomacy posts in relation to event data 
over the period January 1, 2013 through August 31, 2016 and illustrates a strong 
relationship between Chinese diplomatic, military force posture, and foreign aid events 
and days with events with high volumes of public diplomacy posts.  
A. APPROACH 
The first data set measures the dependent variable, which is the volume of China-
related public diplomacy posts by day from January 1, 2013 to August 31, 2016. The 
source of this data is a Buzz Monitor provided through Crimson Hexagon, a social media 
analytics company. It is important to note that Crimson Hexagon is a proprietary 
company and its analytics tools use copyright protected algorithms.100 For this reason, it 
is also important acknowledge the use of data from this source is a potential critique of 
this research since the algorithm used is not from an open source. However, the abilities 
of the Crimson Hexagon Buzz Monitor search allows for a more focused search not only 
by topic but by source as well.  Narrowing the search to China’s sanctioned sources is 
critical to gathering an accurate view of how it is using state media, Twitter, blogs, and 
other forums to transmit their public diplomacy messages.  
The first step in using this platform was to establish clear search parameters to be 
applied by the algorithm during the established period of study. Appendix A contains the 
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full search parameters used in this study. The search parameters consist of key public 
diplomacy terms specific to China’s public diplomacy programs as well as the web 
addresses and Twitter handles of Chinese agencies or state-run organizations that are 
used as mechanisms of public diplomacy. After establishing an additional filter by source 
and type of media, the result was a database consisting of public diplomacy volume by 
day from Chinese state administered news websites, Twitter pages, forums, and blogs. 
The independent variables were derived from four data sets from the Global 
Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT Project). The GDELT Project is an 
open source media-monitoring tool that searches various media sources dating back to 
1979 in over 100 languages for event specific data.101 Domestic protest, military force 
posture, diplomatic cooperation, and provision of foreign aid are the four event types 
making up the event independent variables of this research. The GDELT Project defines 
each event category using the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations and Actor 
(CAMEO) Codebook.102 Each coded event type has sub-event codes accounting for 
different variations of the main event observation. For example, there are 26 variations of 
protest-related events, six variations of military posture, eight variations of diplomatic 
cooperation, and six variations of the provide aid event, each with its own definition and 
code.103 
To compile each of the event data sets for the independent variables required date 
specific searches using GDELT Project’s Analysis Services Event Record Exporter 
tool.104 For example, the protest event data resulted from a search using China as the 
initiating country, civilians as the initiating actor type, using the event code 14, and the 
event location of China. This produced a return of 19,453 protest events over the 44 
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months covered in this study.105 For the force posture events (event code 15), the 
initiating actor and type is the Chinese military, and for both diplomatic cooperation 
(event code 05) and provide aid (event code 07), the initiating actor and type is the 
Chinese government.106  
There are two different independent variables derived from each of the four event 
data sets. The first variable is the total number or count of events on a given day in each 
event category. The second variable is a 30-day rolling average of the count of events on 
a given day in each category. The 30-day rolling average provides an assessment of the 
general trend of the data over a 30-day period prior to each event. The reason for using 
the 30-day rolling average in this regression is that it allows comparison between a single 
day of events versus an average of the previous 30 days’ worth of events, allowing longer 
trends to be more evident. 
The last group of independent variables for this study is a selection specific days 
and 30-day pre- and post-lag periods for each date. Each date variable helps analyze the 
relationship between specific events and Chinese public diplomacy. Each of the selected 
dates produced an event that gained widespread global attention. This study tests the 
relationship between each specific date and the event data in relation to the volume of 
public diplomacy posts. One potential critique of using non-randomly selected dates is 
that this study is “cherry picking” dates that would statistically improve the results of the 
models. However, the counter to this critique is that, by using days that gained global 
attention, it allows analysis of how China uses public diplomacy when the eyes of the 
world are watching and not just on days when there are other global issues competing for 
global media attention. Additionally, since public diplomacy does not just happen as one 
event on one specific day, the two versions of this independent variable cover the 30 days 
prior to and after the specific date. The reason for testing the pre- and post-30-day lag 
periods is to illustrate if China uses public diplomacy prior to and/or after an event to 
shape the global discussion.  
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The first date is June 18, 2014, with a public diplomacy post volume of 28,355 
(see Table 1).107 On June 18, 2014, the Foreign Minister from Vietnam met in Beijing 
with Chinese officials to discuss growing tensions in the South China Sea and specific 
concerns about Vietnamese oil rights.108 Additionally, on June 18, 2014, the Occupy 
Central protests in Hong Kong were gaining global attention amid the Hong Kong 
democracy referendum, which was scheduled for June 20, 2014.109 The second date is 
September 27, 2014, with a post volume of 5,046. This date is significant because it was 
the start of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, which was a major news story of 
2014. During this movement, thousands of pro-democracy students and citizens marched 
and protested for multiple weeks.110 The third date is October 27, 2015, with a public 
diplomacy post volume of 37,377.111 This date is significant because for the first time 
since 2011,112 the U.S. Navy sent a destroyer to patrol just over 12 nautical miles from 
one of the Chinese held islands in the South China Sea.113 The fourth date is July 12, 
2016, with a post volume of 48,497.114 This day is significant because The Hague 
Permanent Court of Arbitration released “The South China Sea Arbitration,” ruling in 
favor of the Philippines, stating that China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are 
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south-china-sea-navy/73525862/.  
113 Jim Sciutto and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Warships Sails Close to Chinese Artificial Island in South 
China Sea,” CNN, October 27, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/politics/south-china-sea-islands-u-s-
destroyer/.  
114 Buzz Monitor search results (raw data), Crimson Hexagon, accessed October 1, 2016, 
https://www.crimsonhexagon.com/.  
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in violation of international law.115 Figure 1 shows PRC public diplomacy by day, 
represented with the gray line, in relation to the specific events discussed above, marked 
by the four vertical dotted lines.  
Figure 1.  Chinese Public Diplomacy Volume with Dated Events116 
 
 
The final category of variables for this study is comprised of the control variables. 
The first control variable is the total volume of public diplomacy related posts by day 
from January 1, 2013 to August 31, 2016. This variable consists of all sources and is not 
restricted to only Chinese sources.117 The second control variable is the total number of 
all recorded events by day from GDELT 1.0 Event Database Normalization Files from 
January 1, 2013 to August 31, 2016.118  These control variables are designed to account 
                                                 
115 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The South China Sea Arbitration: The Republic of the 
Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China,” July 12, 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf.  
116 Adapted from study results from the searches from the Crimson Hexagon database.  
117 Buzz Monitor search results (raw data), Crimson Hexagon, accessed October 1, 2016, 
https://www.crimsonhexagon.com/.  
118 GDELT Project, “GDELT 1.0 Event Database Normalization Files: Daily,” accessed October 3, 
2016, http://www.gdeltproject.org/data.html.  
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for days that generate high volumes of aggregate global news traffic. In addition to the 
total count of posts and events per day, the models also include a 30-day rolling average 
for the public diplomacy and GDELT volume control variables. The intention of the 30-
day rolling average for the control variables is to mitigate the impact of outliers or days 
that have abnormally high numbers of posts or events.  
B. HYPOTHESES 
The analysis below examines three main hypotheses concerning the drivers 
China’s public diplomacy efforts, and one minor hypothesis about how China uses public 
diplomacy in relation to specific events. The first hypothesis (H1) of this study is that 
Chinese public diplomacy volume increases as the number of domestic protests increases. 
In an attempt to influence global perceptions about China’s domestic situation, China is 
expected to increase public diplomacy in an attempt to paint China as a responsible and 
stable state actor. To test H1, the study used models to analyze protest events over time 
and compare aggregate rates of protest with public diplomacy volume. In addition, the 
September 27, 2014 independent variable is used to test for a relationship between the 
emergence of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and Chinese public diplomacy 
posts.  
The second hypothesis (H2) is that as the PLA changes its force posture, China 
will increase its public diplomacy activity to mitigate “China threat” perceptions. To test 
H2, the next models of compared PLA force posture related events to public diplomacy 
volume. The third hypothesis (H3) is that diplomatic and foreign aid related events are 
primary drivers of PRC public diplomacy. To test H3, models examined the relationship 
between PRC public diplomacy and diplomatic and foreign aid events. Diplomatic and 
foreign aid events are important topics for China and allow it to illustrate to the world 
that it is a responsible global actor. Finally, the fourth hypothesis (H4) is that Chinese 
public diplomacy is used to shape the global discussion prior to and after a major event. 
To test H4, the selected date variables with pre- and post-30-day lag periods to examine 
whether there is a relationship between the volume of PRC public diplomacy posts in the 
30 days prior to and after each event. 
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C. REGRESSION MODELS  
This study uses negative binomial regression models to examine what drives 
Chinese public diplomacy volumes. The reason for using a negative binomial regression 
was to create statistically relevant models using day-by-day count variables for both the 
dependent and independent variables. Using the “R” statistical analysis language each 
data set was imported and organized into a single data set showing public diplomacy 
posts by day. After consolidating the data and running multiple regression models, the 
most noticeable trend was that the 30-day rolling averages for the independent variables 
were consistently the most significant factor in relation to the volume of Chinese public 
diplomacy posts. Using these trends, five models provide insight into what drives China’s 
public diplomacy. 
The first model is the baseline model that serves as a starting point from which to 
build and compare the other models. Table 1 illustrates the organization of the 
coefficients for each model as well as the significance levels, which are discussed in the 
following section. Model 1 compares the relationship between Chinese public diplomacy 
posts with the event counts by day, event 30-day rolling averages by day, and the control 
variable counts and 30-day averages (see Appendix B for the equations for each model). 
For models 2 through 5, each consists of the baseline factors described above plus the 
selected day and the pre- and post-30-day lag periods for each of the dates. Model 2 is for 
July 12, 2016, Model 3 examines September 27, 2014, Model 4 compares June 18, 2014, 
and Model 5 is for October 27, 2015. Adding the selected date variables separately to 
each model makes it easier to analyze how the events of that day affect the relationship 
between the other event categories and the overall volume of China’s public diplomacy 
posts. The lag periods also provide insight into how China uses its public diplomacy to 
either shape or react to specific events. 
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Table 1.   Coefficients and Results119 
 
 
                                                 
119 Adapted from study results from the searches from the GDELT Project and the Crimson Hexagon 
databases. Table 2 constructed using R programing language specifically the “stargazer” command Table 
shows coefficients from negative binomial regression models, with standard errors in parentheses. 
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D. RESULTS 
Upon initial inspection, there are three general trends across all five models. First, 
the results show that there is evidence suggesting a relationship between Chinse public 
diplomacy and diplomatic, foreign aid, and force posture events. Second, the day-to-day 
event counts of the force posture, diplomatic cooperation, and foreign aid variables do 
not show a significant relationship with Chinese public diplomacy posts on the same day, 
but the 30-day rolling averages do show significant relationships. Third, there is not 
enough statistical evidence to infer that the protest count or protest 30-day rolling average 
variables have a significant relationship with the volume of public diplomacy posts. The 
protest event results indicate that there is insufficient evidence to infer positively or 
negatively that China increases its online public diplomacy efforts during instances of 
domestic protest. Figure 2 illustrates the data underlying this study; the x-axis is time in 
days, and the y-axis is the count of posts or events. The gray line represents the number 
of Chinese public diplomacy posts per day, the colored lines represent the number of 











Figure 2.  PRC Public Diplomacy versus Event Data120 
 
 
Statistically, the event 30-day rolling averages for force posture, diplomatic 
cooperation, and foreign aid appear to be the main drivers of Chinese public diplomacy. 
These factors are represented by the red, green, and purple lines (respectively) in Figure 
2, and each of these models has statistically significant positive coefficients, with p-
values <0.01. This means that the evidences supports a relationship between the 30-day 
rolling averages for force posture, diplomatic cooperation, foreign aid events, and the 
volume of Chinese public diplomacy posts. These results support Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that as force posture, diplomatic, and foreign aid events 
increase, the volume of public diplomacy will increase as well.  
One interpretation of these results is that when these events occur, China is likely 
to support diplomatic cooperation, force posture moves, or foreign aid actions with public 
diplomacy. This falls in line with the previous discussion in Chapter III about how China 
uses public diplomacy to support its strategic actions and objectives in an attempt to 
brand China in a positive manner. Additionally, using events such as diplomatic 
cooperation and foreign aid helps China to sell a more positive image of itself, which 
                                                 
120 Adapted from study results from the searches from the GDELT Project and the Crimson Hexagon 
databases. 
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reinforces the Chinese claim that it is a responsible global actor. Finally, China can use 
public diplomacy posts to accompany military force posture events as a way to explain 
military moves to prevent misinterpretation and to counter the greater China threat 
perceptions in the international community.  
Another interesting result is that certain dated events seem to be drivers of 
Chinese public diplomacy. The results of the September 27, 2014, Umbrella Movement 
variable show a statistically significant relationship with Chinese public diplomacy, 
whereas the GDELT aggregate protest event data did not. In Figure 2, the first two 
vertical lines represent June 18, 2014 and September 27, 2014, dates (respectively) that 
had large internationally visible protests in China. The June 2014 protests show a 
relatively low public diplomacy volume in comparison to the September 2014 Umbrella 
Movement, which lasted for weeks. The line plot and the data surrounding the Umbrella 
Movement protests suggest that this event was an important driver of Chinese public 
diplomacy. As shown in Table 1, both the pre- and post-30-day lag periods are both 
statistically significant factors in relation to public diplomacy volume, with negative 
coefficients and p-values <0.01. This means that as the number of protest events 
increased, Chinese public diplomacy volume decreased. Additionally, Figure 2 shows 
that in the 30-day time period after September 27, the number of protest events peaked 
and then decreased, whereas the volume of public diplomacy decreased and then 
increased after the number of protests began to decline.  A potential explanation for the 
initial reduction in public diplomacy volume is that China did not want to draw global 
attention to the protests in Hong Kong until it had gained control of the situation.  This 
allows China to control the narrative and show the world that the Chinese government is 
a more restrained and responsible actor than historic events like Tiananmen Square 
massacre suggest.  
Additionally, Figure 2 shows spikes in public diplomacy volume during the days 
leading up to and following the U.S. Navy patrol of the South China Sea, on October 27, 
2015. The results show statistically significant positive coefficients, with p-values <0.05 
indicating that there is a relationship between public diplomacy posts and the 30 days 
prior to October 27, 2015. The findings also indicate significant positive coefficients with 
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p-values <0.01, showing a relationship between public diplomacy posts and the 30-day 
period after October 27, 2015. This event illustrates a relationship between Chinese 
public diplomacy and events that were well publicized in the global media. In this case, 
the United States had signaled through statements in September of 2015 by President 
Obama, the secretary of defense, and U.S. Navy officials that the United States would 
conduct patrols to maintain the Freedom of Navigation Act.121 This is important when 
analyzing the pre-30-day lag results because U.S. signaling through official statements 
and press releases could also have triggered a response from China within the 30 days 
leading up to October 27, 2025. Additionally, the post-30-day increase of public 
diplomacy in relation to the Navy patrol is expected, as China would have to counter U.S. 
actions in the South China Sea, specifically to signal strength to regional partners as well 
as to domestic and foreign Chinese audiences.  
The most surprising result from the date specific factors was the lack of strong 
relationship between the July 12, 2016 Hague South China Sea ruling and Chinese public 
diplomacy volume. This is surprising because July 12, 2016 had the highest volume of 
Chinese public diplomacy posts, though there was no statistical evidence to show a 
relationship with that date and Chinese public diplomacy once the control variables were 
considered.  After The Hague’s announcement, however, we find a moderately 
significant positive coefficient, with p-value <0.1, showing a relationship between the 
post-30-day lag period and the volume of Chinese public diplomacy. This provides some 
evidence that the PRC may in fact have used public diplomacy after The Hague ruling, 
rejecting the ruling and the legitimacy of The Hague and vowing to protect what China 
called its “sovereignty over the South China Sea.”122 
E. IMPORTANCE OF RESULTS 
Overall, the statistical results of this study show that Chinese public diplomacy 
accompanies diplomatic, foreign aid, and military force posture events. However, the 
                                                 
121 Larter, “Navy Will Challenge.”  
122 Ben Blanchard and Martin Petty, “China Vows to Protect South China Sea Sovereignty, Manila 
Upbeat,” Reuters World News, July 14, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-
stakes-idUSKCN0ZS02U.  
 37
results of the Umbrella Movement, U.S. Navy patrol, and the South China Sea ruling 
events also demonstrate relationships between each specific event and public diplomacy, 
revealing general trends about how China uses public diplomacy. More importantly, the 
main conclusion derived from the regression models is that diplomatic, foreign aid, and 
military force posture events are the central drivers of Chinese public diplomacy. 
Additionally, specific events can also be drivers of Chinese public diplomacy, though this 
can depend greatly on context. This is especially likely when the event gains international 
media attention, in which case it appears that China uses public diplomacy to shape the 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses the implications of the regression results for DOD 
information operations (IO) planners, and it provides recommendations for the future use 
of Internet-monitoring tools to help the U.S. military gain a position of advantage within 
the information environment. Even though the DOD may only provide support to public 
diplomacy, the results and implications of this study are significant to DOD planners 
operating within the information environment to influence audiences.  
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOD PLANNERS 
The three major planning considerations that the results of this study highlight are 
the use of messaging volume, proactive messaging, and creating messages that account 
for positive and negative events.  
1. Credible Volume 
Across the four specific events studied, the statistics illustrate inconsistencies in 
Chinese public diplomacy volume levels in relation to pre- and post-event messaging. 
The lesson for DOD IO planners is that they must take advantage of pre- and post-event 
messaging opportunities. If a planning staff has the ability to anticipate an event through 
intelligence or planned actions, a credible, comprehensive, and diversely sourced 
messaging campaign must be designed and implemented to shape the perceptions of the 
target audience prior to and after an event. In addition to credible messaging, planners 
must increase the volume of messaging across the range of available communication 
mediums. Increasing credible messaging through volume is an attempt by planners to 
saturate the information environment with repetitive, multi-sourced, truthful messaging at 
a high volume that maximizes the reach of the message to the target audience while out-
communicating the competition. Additionally, when competing in the information 
environment to shape target audience perceptions, planners must use credible volume to 
gain audience attention and tap into an audiences’ thrust for verifiable, true information. 
This requires a definitive strategy from policy makers and an organizational structure in 
which joint, interagency, and partner nations are working together towards common 
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objectives and are all involved in the planning, execution, and assessment of the 
information campaign. 
2. Proactive Messaging  
Critical to pre- and post-event messaging is the speed of message dissemination. 
When possible, DOD planners must quickly and proactively message the target audience 
instead of only countering opposing messages. A simple Internet search for “countering 
Russian or Chinese propaganda” results in numerous articles about how the United States 
must do more to counter the influence campaigns of China or Russia. Countering the 
information campaigns and propaganda of competing nations is necessary; however, 
using staff time to plan counter narrative messaging campaigns, leaves less time and 
resources available to communicate a positive narrative of the United States to target 
audiences. Overemphasizing the need to counter competing narratives, concedes an 
influence advantage to competing state and non-state actors in the information 
environment.  
To avoid this concession, DOD planners must first use proactive messaging to 
promote the U.S. narrative. Proactive messaging means that DOD planners should use 
information campaigns to set the pace, tone, and timing of communications with the 
target audience, and they should not wait for competing messages to reach the target 
audience prior to acting. Additionally, DOD planners must establish definitive counter 
narrative criteria that specify what type of competing messages require attention. The 
criteria must consider the tone, reach, believability, and the potential negative effects the 
competing messages have on strategic objectives. Countering only the messages that 
meet the select criteria allows DOD planners to react when necessary while maintaining 
the integrity of the broader information campaign.  
3. Positive and Negative Events 
The third implication from this study for DOD information operations planners is 
that U.S. information campaigns must address both negative and positive events. 
Statistically speaking, Chinese public diplomacy focuses on mostly positive events, in 
this study specifically, diplomatic cooperation and foreign aid. The results show little 
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relationship between protest events in China and the Chinese use of public diplomacy. 
Addressing instances of civil unrest within China through public diplomacy does not 
present a positive image of domestic stability to potential investors or Chinese diaspora 
living abroad. However, by not addressing domestic protests and other negatively 
perceived events, it allows other actors in the information environment to lead the 
discussion about China’s domestic situation. The lesson for DOD planners is that 
ignoring negative events leaves a void in the global conversation, allowing other actors to 
seize the advantage. It is not possible for the United States to ignore negative events. 
Thus, the best option for DOD IO planners is to use information campaigns to contribute 
to the discussion within the information environment using truth and facts to explain the 
situation and what the United States is doing to address negative issues.  
The actions of the United States attract global attention, and DOD IO planners 
must address both negative and positive events to manage global perceptions. During the 
global war on terror, the U.S. Department of Defense has had to address multiple 
negative events ranging from civilian casualties, mistreatment of detainees, and other 
sensitive issues that caused outrage in the global court of public opinion. The DOD 
already has systems and procedures in place to publicly address negative or crisis related 
events but one way to improve the management of negative events is through near real 
time assessments that assist planners in understanding if the crisis mitigation efforts are 
successful or not. Using Internet-monitoring tools to measure sentiment about a given 
event would assist public affairs organizations and IO planners in analyzing if a crisis 
messaging campaign is successful in managing perceptions.  
B. APPLICATION OF MONITORING TOOLS 
As discussed in the approach section of Chapter IV, the data for this study came 
from a Crimson Hexagon Buzz Monitor and the GDELT Project’s Event Exporter tool. 
As the Internet has become one of the most prominent mediums of communication 
throughout the world and as technology continues to improve, private businesses and the 
DOD are investing time and resources to research how to best use Internet-monitoring 
tools. This section highlights the personal lessons gained from using the Crimson 
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Hexagon Buzz Monitor from this study to discuss planning considerations and ways to 
improve Internet-monitoring tools for future DOD use. It is important to note that social 
media analytics and event data archives are only tools and require a great deal of prior 
research about the topic, audience, and competing actors in the information environment. 
The information gained from these tools is just data and requires detailed analysis; staffs 
must process and scrutinize the data to gain true understanding of what the information 
actually means for their organizations. This requires that planners understand the 
mechanics of how each Internet-monitoring tool compiles the data, which also allows 
planners to control for and fill any potential gaps in the information or results to ensure 
the highest level of understanding. 
1. Creating a Baseline 
Internet monitoring tools provide valuable information that can provide planners 
with baseline information about the information environment, which can assist planners 
in creating information campaigns to more effectively reach target audiences. This 
requires a significant amount of time devoted to researching the topic and the specific 
actors for each project. One of the most important aspects of using tools such as Crimson 
Hexagon is the creation of the search criteria. If there are gaps in the search criteria, the 
data will not accurately represent reality and will cause planners to make decisions using 
incomplete information. Wide searches result in a greater number of returns based upon 
the established search criteria and narrow searches will focus on specific authors or 
websites using the search criteria (see Appendix A for examples). The upfront investment 
in research results in a comprehensive baseline of data to assist planners in understanding 
the situation within the information environment and lead to more efficient IO targeting 
and improved campaign assessments. Understanding the topics and discussion trends is 
critical in planning an information campaign because planners must be able to design 
their messages to fit as part of the ongoing discussions within the information 
environment.   
Additionally, sentiment analysis tools are also important in understanding the 
target audience. Sentiment analysis tools categorize posts within a search monitor into 
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positive, neutral, and negative sentiment, allowing the user to gain a general 
understanding of how the topic is trending among other people and organizations. Figure 
3 shows the sentiment analysis results from the Crimson Hexagon Monitor for this 
thesis.123 Another useful tool for audience analysis is the source breakdown tool that 
illustrates the various communication mediums used a given search monitor. Figure 4 is 
the source breakdown for the search results about Chinese online public diplomacy, 
showing that the discussion about Chinese public diplomacy is mostly taking place on 
news sites, blogs, Twitter accounts, and forums to transmit public diplomacy 
messages.124 
Figure 3.  Crimson Hexagon Sentiment about PRC Public Diplomacy125 
 
Sentiment of all searchable sources about PRC public diplomacy from the Crimson 
Hexagon Buzz Monitor search results from January 1, 2013, to August 31, 2016.  
 
                                                 
123 Buzz Monitor search results, “PACOM: PRC Public Diplomacy: Basic Sentiment from 1/1/13 to 
8/31/16,” Crimson Hexagon, accessed November 14, 2016, https://www.crimsonhexagon.com/.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Ibid.  
 44
Figure 4.  Crimson Hexagon Source Breakdown for PRC Public Diplomacy126 
 
Breakdown of the sources for the Crimson Hexagon Buzz Monitor search results from 
January 1, 2013, to August 31, 2016.   
 
A simple example using the data from this study shows that at first glance, a 
reader will see a largely neutral and negative-leaning sentiment trend for the topic of 
Chinese public diplomacy. However, if this is combined with the source breakdown, the 
sentiment results makes more sense, as it seems likely that high percentages of news 
sources contribute to higher percentages of neutral posts. This is just one example of how 
planners can use these analytical tools to provide insight about the audience and how 
organizations use the media sources. It is also an example of a necessary future research 
project that would help planners understand how to use sentiment analysis within 
different forms of media. This example also highlights two new questions that planners 
would have to answer: (1) “what is driving the neutral sentiment?” and (2) “are media 
sources really neutral?”  
2. Assessment 
Using Internet-monitoring tools to assess information campaigns is the latest area 
of consideration for DOD planners. The simplest way to measure success of an 
information campaign is to compare current results against the baseline data over time. 
                                                 
126 Ibid.  
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To understand if an information campaign is effective, planners must define success with 
clear, realistic objectives. If there is not an available baseline to compare current results 
to, planners must gather historic data to assess whether or not a campaign has been 
successful. Internet monitoring tools can help gather the historical data necessary to 
measure change in the information environment for assessments. To measure for success, 
there also must be continual comparison of the current data to the baseline data to show 
changes that support or contradict the stated objectives. For example, planners could use 
changes in sentiment of a given topic to illustrate the effectiveness of an information 
campaign. Alternatively, analysts could monitor key influential author posts, such as 
news sources, blogs, or Twitter accounts, to look for changes in how they perceive events 
or messaging related to the information campaign. Planning how to assess an information 
campaign is just as important as planning the campaign itself, and without assessments, it 
is impossible to measure success or to modify existing plans to achieve success.  
C. CONCLUSION  
This thesis examined how events influenced China’s use of public diplomacy 
through statistical analysis. The study began by defining public diplomacy, followed by a 
discussion about China’s strategic objectives and how China uses public diplomacy to 
help achieve its strategic objectives. The results of the statistical research highlight how 
domestic protest, diplomatic cooperation, military force posture, foreign aid events, and 
specific dated events relate to the volume of China’s public diplomacy over a wide range 
of Internet sources. This regression analysis consisted of a comparison between Chinese 
public diplomacy volume from state sanctioned Chinese online sources compiled using a 
Crimson Hexagon Buzz Monitor and event data categories compiled using the GDELT 
Project’s Event Exporter tool. The final section discussed the implications of the 
regression results for DOD IO planners as well as recommended improvements to tools 
like Crimson Hexagon. 
The main findings of this study illustrate that diplomatic, foreign aid, and military 
force posture events are drivers of Chinese public diplomacy and that specific events can 
also be drivers of China’s public diplomacy, both prior to, and after the event. This is 
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especially true if the event gains international attention, in which case China will be more 
likely to use public diplomacy to attempt shape the global discussion about the event and 
about China. These relationships between event data and Chinese public diplomacy 
reinforce the idea that China uses public diplomacy to support strategic objectives and to 
brand the country not as a threat but as a responsible global power whose strength lies in 
a strong economy with a stable population.  
There are multiple future research opportunities pertaining to the topic of China’s 
public diplomacy and the study of strategic influence campaigns. This thesis discusses 
the use of proactive messaging as opposed to counter-messaging. An interesting research 
project would be an analysis of the effectiveness of counter-narrative or counter-
messaging campaigns against a case study country, such as China or Russia, or non-state 
actors, such as terrorist organizations. Another important research project would be to 
analyze the accuracy of sentiment analysis tools as a metric of measurement for 
information campaigns seeking to influence a target audience’s behavior. For instance, is 
a target audience with overwhelmingly positive views toward the United States more 
likely to take action that is supportive of U.S. policy and objectives? Finally, a 
comparative study investigating which tools more accurately measure effectiveness, 
comparing passive listening tools like the GDELT Project and Crimson Hexagon, to 
active listening techniques such as polling data, would be an excellent contribution to this 
area of study.  
This thesis analyzed the drivers of Chinese public diplomacy using tools that are 
gaining attention in DOD IO communities. These tools are critical to the analysis of state and 
non-state actor messaging, and can provide analysts valuable clues as to how an actor may 
behave. As China continues to assert its influence throughout the world it is critical to 
understand what China is doing and why, in order to accurately assess the potential threats 
posed by China’s rise. To maintain an advantage in the information environment, the United 
States must continue to development technologies like Internet-monitoring tools but more 
importantly, the United States must invest more in the professionals who are tasked to win 
the battles of strategic influence by providing them with the best education and training, and 
by creating organizational structures that promote interagency cooperation.  
 47
APPENDIX A. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SEARCH PARAMETERS 
Monitor Keywords: ((Message themes) AND (CHINA) AND (potential case study 
countries)AND(twitter handles) or (websites)):  
(“Chinese culture” OR “cultural exchanges” OR “cultural exhibit” OR “Chinese cultural 
exhibit” OR “Chinese cultural exhibits” OR “student exchange” OR exchange OR culture 
OR “business exchange” OR “citizen exchanges” OR “military exchange “OR “military 
to military exchange” OR “military-to-military exchanges” or “military-to-military 
relations” OR “PLA peacekeeping” OR “Peoples liberation army peacekeeping” OR 
“peoples liberation army mission to UN” OR “peoples liberation army mission to the 
United Nations” OR “PLA UN peacekeeping mission” “Chinese United Nations 
Peacekeeping” OR “peaceful development” OR “heping fazhan” OR “和平发展”OR 
“economic development” OR “harmonious society” OR “hexie shehui” OR “和谐社会” 
OR “harmonious region” OR “win- win” OR “win win” OR “Win-Win cooperation” OR 
“mutual cooperation” OR “international cooperation” OR “international partner” OR 
“international partnership” OR “international partners” OR “bilateral cooperation” 
“bilateral partner” OR “bilateral partnership” OR bilateral partners” OR “multilateral 
cooperation” OR “multilateral partner” OR “multilateral partners” OR “multilateral 
partnership” OR “responsible partner” OR “economic modernization” OR “industrial 
modernization” OR “military modernization” OR “Peoples liberation army 
modernization” OR “PLA modernization” OR “economic growth” OR “Beijing 
consensus” OR “china young volunteers association” OR “Confucius institute” OR 
“overseas Chinese affairs office of the state council” OR “trans pacific partnership” OR 
TPP OR “Association of Southeast Asian Nations” OR ASEAN OR “freedom of 
navigation” OR “Freedom of the seas” OR “five principles of peaceful coexistence” OR 
“five PPC” OR “5 PPC” OR “nonintervention foreign policy” OR “nonintervention” OR 
“noninterference principle” OR “economic independence” OR “the Hague” OR “SCS 
Arbitration” OR “South China Sea Arbitration” OR “SCS Ruling” OR “public 
diplomacy” OR “cultural diplomacy” OR “china’s tourism diplomacy” OR “Tourism 
diplomacy” OR “cultural ambassador” OR “Chinese language education” OR 
“experience China” OR “South China Sea” OR SCS OR Netizens OR “seeking truth” OR 
“human rights” OR “China’s Rise” OR “China Threat” OR “China’s environmental 
crisis” OR Tibet OR Xinjiang OR Taiwan OR “cross-strait policy” OR “9 dash line” OR 
“Nine Dash line” OR “one belt one road” OR “foreign aid” OR “foreign direct 
investment” OR “Humanitarian aid” OR “economic aid” OR “free trade” OR “China 
model” OR “anti-corruption” OR “corruption policy” OR “Go-out” OR “going out” OR 
“go south” OR “corporate Diplomacy” OR “great revitalization” OR “Weida fuxin” OR “
伟大复兴” OR “Peaceful Rise” OR “heping jueqi” OR “和平崛起” OR “go abroad” OR 
zauhuqu OR “出国” OR “去国外” OR “close-to principles” OR santiejing OR “贴近原
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则” OR “Foreign Affairs” OR “made in China” OR “Made-in-China” OR “Chinese 
Peoples Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries” OR “Institute of Foreign 
Affairs” OR IFA OR “People to People Diplomacy” OR “people-to-people diplomacy” 
OR “overseas Chinese communities” OR “no strings attached” OR “no-political-strings-
attached” OR “no political strings attached” OR “China Dream” OR “Peoples 
diplomacy” OR “min jian waijao” OR “人民外交” OR “Inspirational Power” OR 
ganzhaoli OR “励志电源” OR “Beijing Review” OR “Government Work Reports for 
National People’s Congress” OR “Government Work Reports for NPC” OR 
“Government Work Reports” OR “new security concept” OR “Common Security” OR 
“collective security” OR “confidence building” OR Storyboard OR “Journeys in Times” 
OR “Centre Stage” OR Travelogue OR “learning Chinese” OR “Rediscover China” OR 
“TV Foreign Propaganda Coordinator” OR “Ministry of Education” OR “Chinese 
Ministry of Education” OR Hanban OR “Confucius classroom” OR “Hill and Knowlton” 
OR “Hill & Knowlton” OR “Socialist Democracy” Or “Corporate social responsibility” 
OR “populations quality” OR “renmin sushi” OR “人口素质” OR “Chinese nationals 
working overseas” OR huaqiao OR “中国公民在海外工作” OR “Chinese with Foreign 
citizenship” OR “ethnic Chinese” OR Huaren OR huayi OR “华人” OR “Chinese 
Students” OR “Liu xue Sheng” OR “中国学生” OR “overseas Chinese sojourners” OR 
“Huaren huaqiao” OR “海外的中国旅居者” OR “juan zeng guoqi” OR “flag donation” 
OR investment OR investments OR “State Council Information Office” OR SCIO 
“ministry of Foreign Affairs” OR hegemon OR hegemonic OR “anti-hegemony” OR 
hegemony OR “hegemonic power” OR “regional hegemon” OR “global hegemon” OR 
“world hegemon” OR “CCP publicity department” OR “party publicity department” OR 
“Chinas publicity department” OR “strengthening the country through human talent” OR 
“rencai qiang guo” OR “Beijing Diplomacy Institute” OR “Mandarin studies” OR 
“Chinese language studies” OR “Chinese studies” OR “Beijing Art Fair” OR “China 
Week” OR “Chinese cultural week” OR “Chinese culture week” OR “China Trade 
Week” OR “Chinese Culture Year” OR “China Year” OR “Chinese Cultural Centers” 
OR “Chinese Cultural Center” OR “Chinese Cultural Centre” OR “cultural 
performances” OR “Chinese cultural performances” OR “Chinese Art exhibits” OR 
“Chinese Art exhibition” OR “Chinese Art” OR “Chinese dance” OR “Chinese Dancers” 
Or “Chinese movies” OR “great wall of China” OR “terracotta Army” OR “terracotta 
warrior” OR “terracotta warriors” OR “Forbidden City” OR “Ming Dynasty” OR “Qing 
Dynasty” OR “Imperial Palace” OR “Chinese New Years” OR “Chinese Acrobats” OR 
“China Acrobats” OR “Visit China” OR “Ancient Chinese culture” OR “traditional 
Chinese medicine” OR “Chinese Medicine” OR “acupuncture” OR “Civilization 
Exchanges” OR “innovation cooperation” OR “mutual learning” OR “Photo Album of 
the Peoples Republic of China” OR “World heritage in China” OR “Bravo China” OR 
“Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa” OR “Cultural Cooperation agreement” OR 
“education cooperation agreement” OR “education cooperation” OR “Chinas world 
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economic forum” OR “Boao Forum” OR “Beijing International Conference” OR 
“Shanghai International Conference” OR “Chinese Model” OR “China model” OR 
“Shanghai Cooperation Organization” OR “White Paper” OR “Chinas peaceful 
development road” OR “PRC donations” OR “China donates” OR “Chinese government 
donation” OR “PRC donated” OR “PRC donates” OR “Chinese donations” OR “PRC 
grant” OR “Chinese grant” OR “Chinese loan” OR “PRC loan” OR “infrastructure 
development” OR “foreign infrastructure development” OR “agricultural development” 
OR “infrastructure agreement” OR “infrastructure agreements” “trade cooperation” OR 
“military equipment sales” OR “military defense contract” OR “The China Road and 
Bridge Corporation” OR “China Radio International” OR “China Red Cross Society” OR 
“the All-China Federation of Trade Unions” OR ACFTU OR “PRC Scholarships” OR 
“National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language” OR NOCFL OR “one 
China” OR “one China policy” OR “Chinese embassy” OR “PRC embassy” OR 
“Ministry of Resources” OR “Ministry of Defense” OR “Chinese peoples association for 
friendship with foreign countries” OR CPAFFC OR “China National Tourism 
Administration” OR CNTA OR “Shanghai tourism commission” OR “Chinese national 
office for teaching Chinese as a foreign language” OR “Confucius Colleges” OR “Asia 
Games” OR “Chinese Soft Power” OR “China soft power” OR “international academic 
cooperation” OR “economic cooperation” OR “business cooperation” OR “Chinese 
Cultural events” OR “Chinese propaganda” OR “PLA propaganda” OR Peoples 
liberation army propaganda” OR “PRC Propaganda Office” OR “PRC Foreign 
propaganda office” OR “Chinese propaganda office” OR “Chinese foreign propaganda 
office” OR “think-tank communication” OR “cross-cultural communication” OR “cross 
cultural exchanges” OR “cross-cultural exchange” OR “cross cultural exchange” OR 
“cross-cultural exchange” OR “All-China Youth Federation” OR “youth exchanges” OR 
“China’s National conference on Science and Technology innovation” OR “cultural 
exchange mechanism” OR “media cooperation” OR “Forum on media cooperation” OR 
“State Administration of the Press, publication, radio, film and television of China” OR 
“window into China” OR “foreign media investment”) AND ((China OR “Peoples 
Republic of China” OR PRC OR Chinese) AND (Argentina OR Brazil OR Canada OR 
France OR Germany OR Ghana OR Greece OR India OR Indonesia OR Israel OR Italy 
OR Japan OR Jordan OR Kenya OR Lebanon OR Malaysia OR Mexico OR Nigeria OR 
Pakistan OR Palestinian Territory OR Philippines OR Poland OR Russia OR Senegal OR 
South Africa OR South Korea OR Spain OR Turkey OR Uganda OR UK OR “United 
Kingdom” OR England OR Briton OR USA OR “United States” or “United States of 
America” OR U.S. OR Venezuela) AND (author: @CCTV_World OR author: 
@CCTV_America OR author: @CCTVnews OR author: @CCTV_TheHeat OR author: 
@CCTVdialogue OR author: @CCTVtravelogue OR author: @CCTV_brk OR author: 
@CCTVnewsafrica OR author: @CCTV_CHINA OR author: @CCTVgloblbiz OR 
author: @CCTVAmericasNOW OR author: @eurobreaking OR author: @CCTV OR 
author: @FullFrameCCTV OR author: @Chinascio OR author: @Chinaorgcn OR 
author: @PDChina OR author: @XHNews OR author: @china OR author: 
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@ChinaEUMission OR author: @ChinaDailyUSA OR author: @ChinaDailyEU OR 
author: @ChinaDailyAsia OR author: @ChinaPlusNews OR author: @CankaoXiaoxiCP 
OR author: @globaltimesnews OR author: @Echinanews OR author: @GlobalTimesLife 
OR author: @PDChinese OR author: @GlobalTimesBiz OR author: @XinhuaEurope 
OR author: @YouthChina OR author: @CHINAYOUTH_P OR author: 
@ConfuciusInsti3 OR author: @ConfuciusMCR OR author: @UoM_Confucius OR 
author: @GoldsmithsCI OR author: @CI4TCM OR author: @ateneoconfucius OR 
author: @ConfuciusTSD OR author: @ConfuciusTSD OR author: @UCL_IOE_CI OR 
author: @CISSStrathclyde OR author: @HanbanCIO OR author: @CI4Scotland OR 
author: @Learn_Chinse OR author: @bounconfucius, @U_of_Regina, 
@ConfuciusICLUJ, @cmconfucius, @unesaconfucius, @confucius_sg OR author: 
@Confuciouskong OR author: @ConfuciBCN OR author: @IC_PLA OR author: 
@icbretagne OR author: @CELE_CONFUCIO OR author: @ConfucioUC OR author: 
@MadridConfucio OR author: @ConfucioUST OR author: @ConfucioPUCP OR author: 
@iconfuciougr OR author: @IConfucio OR author: @ciutdallas OR author: @CIatCSU 
OR author: @CIPfeiffer OR author: @WKUConfucius OR author: @UDCONFUCIUS 
OR author: @ConfuciusIdaho OR author: @confuciusbiz OR author: @ConfuciusNJCU 
OR author: @GWConfucius OR author: @ConfuciusInstKU OR author: 
@ConfuciusInsti1 OR author: @CCSUCI OR author: @CathayPak OR author: 
@Chinamission2un OR author: @chinascio OR author: @china OR author: 
@ChinaEUMission OR author: @ChinaEmbOttawa) OR (site: “chinadaily.com.cn” OR 
site: “cyol.net/” OR site: “eeo.com.cn” OR site: “globaltimes.cn” OR site: “huanqiu.com” 
OR site: “grrb.com.cn/” OR site: “en.gmw.cn/” OR site: “legaldaily.com.cn/” OR site: 
“en.people.cn/” OR site: “english.gov.cn” OR site: “china.org.cn/” OR site: 
“tv.cctv.com/cctvnews/” OR site: “english.cctv.com/” OR site: “cctv-america.com/” OR 
site: “cctv.cntv.cn/lm/cctvafrica/” OR site: “english.cntv.cn/lm/africalive/” OR site: 
“cctv.cntv.cn/lm/talkafrica/index.shtml” OR site: 
“cctv.cntv.cn/lm/facesofafrica/index.shtml” OR site: “cctv-africa.com/” OR site: 
“cctv.cntv.cn/lm/asiatoday/” OR site: “cctv.cntv.cn/lm/assignmentasia/” OR site: 
“english.cntv.cn/lm/spectrumasia/” OR site: “asiapacific.cctv.com/” OR site: 
“people.com.cn/” OR site: “en.people.cn/” OR site: “chinamission.be/eng/” OR site: 
“china-un.org/eng/” OR site: “chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/” OR site: “china-
embassy.org/eng/hzqz/default.htm” OR site: “chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/” OR site: 
“chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/” OR site: “losangeles.china-consulate.org/eng/” OR site: 
“houston.china-consulate.org/eng/” OR site: “ar.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “ar.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “br.china-embassy.org” OR site “br.chineseembassy.org” OR site: 
“riodejaneiro.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “riodejaneiro.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
“saopaulo.china-consulate.org” OR site: “saopaulo.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“ca.china-embassy.org” OR site: “ca.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “calgary.china-
consulate.org” OR site: “montreal.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “toronto.china-
consulate.org” OR site: “toronto.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “vancouver.china-
consulate.org” OR site: “vancouver.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “amb-chine.fr” OR 
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site: “fr.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “fr.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“lyon.consulatchine.org” OR site: “marseille.china-consulate.org/” OR site: 
“marseille.chineseconsulate.org/” OR site: “papeete.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“consulatchine-strasbourg.org” OR site: “strasbourg.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“strasbourg.china-consulate.org” OR site: “china-botschaft.de” OR site: 
“de.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “de.china-embassy.org” OR site: “frankfurt.china-
consulate.org” OR site: “frankfurt.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “gr.china-embassy.org” 
OR site: “gr.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “it.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “it.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “firenze.china-consulate.org/chn/” OR site: “milano.china-
consulate.org” OR site: “chinaembassy.org.pl” OR site: “pl.chineseembassy.org” OR 
site: “pl.china-embassy.org” OR site: “gdansk.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“embajadachina.es” OR site: “es.chineseembassy.org” OR site: es.china-embassy.org” 
OR site: “barcelona.china-consulate.org” OR site: “barcelona.chineseconsulate.org” OR 
site: “chinese-embassy.org.uk” OR site: “belfast.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
“belfast.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “edinburgh.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
“edinburgh.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “manchester.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“manchester.china-consulate.org” OR site: “ve.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “ve.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “embajadachina.org.mx” OR site: “mx.china-embassy.org” OR 
site: “mx.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “gh.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“gh.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “ke.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“ke.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “ng.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “ng.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “lagos.china-consulate.org” OR site: “lagos.chineseconsulate.org” 
OR site: “sn.chineseembassy.org/” OR site: “chinese-embassy.org.za” OR site: “za.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “za.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “capetown.china-consulate.org” 
OR site: “capetown.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “durban.china-consulate.org” OR 
site: “durban.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “johannesburg.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
“johannesburg.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “ug.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“ug.chineseembassy.org” OR site: il.china-embassy.org OR site: “il.chineseembassy.org” 
OR site: “jo.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “jo.china-embassy.org” OR site: “lb.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “lb.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “tr.chineseembassy.org” OR 
site: “tr.china-embassy.org” OR site: “istanbul.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“istanbul.china-consulate.org” OR site: “in.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“in.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “in.mofcom.gov.cn” OR site: “kolkata.china-
consulate.org/eng/” OR site: “mumbai.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
“mumbai.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “id.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“denpasar.china-consulate.org/” OR site: “denpasar.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“medan.china-consulate.org” OR site: “surabaya.china-consulate.org/” OR site: 
“surabaya.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “china-embassy.or.jp” OR site: “jp.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “jp.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “fukuoka.china-consulate.org” 
OR site: “fukuoka.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “nagasaki.china-consulate.org” OR 
site: “nagasaki.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “nagoya.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“nagoya.china-consulate.org” OR site: “niigata.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
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“osaka.china-consulate.org” OR site: “osaka.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “chn-
consulate-sapporo.or.jp” OR site: “sapporo.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
“sapporo.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “my.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“my.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “kuching.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“pk.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “pk.china-embassy.org” OR site: “karachi.china-
consulate.org/” OR site: “karachi.chineseconsulate.org/” OR site: “ph.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “ph.chineseembassy.org” OR site: 
“cebu.chineseconsulate.org/chn/” OR site: “cebu.chineseconsulate.org/eng/” OR site: 
“laoag.china-consulate.org” OR site: “laoag.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “ru.china-
embassy.org” OR site: “ru.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “irkutsk.chineseconsulate.org/” 
OR site: “chinaconsulate.khb.ru” OR site: “khabarovsk.china-consulate.org” OR site: 
“khabarovsk.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “saint-petersburg.china-consulate.org” OR 
site: “saint-petersburg.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “stpetersburg.china-consulate.org” 
OR site: “stpetersburg.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: 
“ekaterinburg.chineseconsulate.org” OR site: “kr.china-embassy.org” OR site: 
“kr.chineseembassy.org” OR site: “gwangju.china-consulate.org” OR site: 






APPENDIX B. REGRESSION MODELS 
Model One:  
                       1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 0  y b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b            
 
When:  y1 = Count of Chinese public diplomacy posts per day 
x1 =Protest count per day  
  x2 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x3 = Force Posture count per day 
x4 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x5 = Diplomatic Cooperation count per day 
  x6 = Diplomatic Cooperation 30-day rolling average 
  x7 = Provide Foreign Aid count per day 
  x8 = Provide Foreign Aid 30-day rolling average 
x9 =Protest count per day 
  x10 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x11 = Force Posture count per day 
x12 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
 
Model Two:  
 
                             5 5 7 71 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 6 6 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 0   y b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b               
 
When:  y1 = Count of Chinese public diplomacy posts per day 
x1 =Protest count per day  
  x2 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x3 = Force Posture count per day 
x4 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x5 = Diplomatic Cooperation count per day 
  x6 = Diplomatic Cooperation 30-day rolling average 
  x7 = Provide Foreign Aid count per day 
  x8 = Provide Foreign Aid 30-day rolling average 
x9 = Protest count per day 
  x10 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x11 = Force Posture count per day 
x12 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x13 = July 12 2016  
  x14 = July 12 2016 Pre 30-day 






Model Three:  
 
                             5 5 7 71 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 6 6 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 16 16 17 17 18 18 0   y b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b               
  
When:  y1 = Count of Chinese public diplomacy posts per day 
x1 =Protest count per day  
  x2 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x3 = Force Posture count per day 
x4 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x5 = Diplomatic Cooperation count per day 
  x6 = Diplomatic Cooperation 30-day rolling average 
  x7 = Provide Foreign Aid count per day 
  x8 = Provide Foreign Aid 30-day rolling average 
x9 = Protest count per day 
  x10 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x11 = Force Posture count per day 
x12 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x16 = September 27 2015  
  x17 = September 27 2015 Pre 30-day 




                             5 5 7 71 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 6 6 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 1 20 20 21 29 19 1 0   y b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b               
 
When:  y1 = Count of Chinese public diplomacy posts per day 
x1 =Protest count per day  
  x2 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x3 = Force Posture count per day 
x4 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x5 = Diplomatic Cooperation count per day 
  x6 = Diplomatic Cooperation 30-day rolling average 
  x7 = Provide Foreign Aid count per day 
  x8 = Provide Foreign Aid 30-day rolling average 
x9 = Protest count per day 
  x10 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x11 = Force Posture count per day 
x12 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x19 = June 18 2014  
  x20 = June 18 2014 Pre 30-day 






Model Five:  
                             5 5 7 71 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 6 6 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 22 22 23 23 24 24 0   y b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b x b               
 
When:  y1 = Count of Chinese public diplomacy posts per day 
x1 =Protest count per day  
  x2 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x3 = Force Posture count per day 
x4 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x5 = Diplomatic Cooperation count per day 
  x6 = Diplomatic Cooperation 30-day rolling average 
  x7 = Provide Foreign Aid count per day 
  x8 = Provide Foreign Aid 30-day rolling average 
x9 = Protest count per day 
  x10 = Protest 30-day rolling average 
  x11 = Force Posture count per day 
x12 = Force Posture count 30-day rolling average 
  x19 = October 27 2014  
  x20 = October 27 2014 Pre 30-day 
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